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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff/ Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff'or "Ms. Macias") asks this Court to 
overturn the dismissal without prejudice of her wrongful death/survival action complaint. 
Specifically, Ms. Macias contends that the district court erred when it dismissed her complaint 
pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2} for failure to serve the complaint within six months after the complaint was 
filed. 
This dispute arises out of the unfortunate death of Ms. Macias's adult daughter. (R., Vol. I, 
p. 18.) At the time of her death Ms. Macias's daughter was living at a facility for which certain 
services are provided by the Defendant/Respondent Club, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant" 
or "Club"). Id. Ms. Macias's daughter committed suicide on or about January 20, 2008 while 
residing in this facility. Id. 
Ms. Macias initially sought informa pauperis status and a waiver of filing fees. (R., Vol. 
1, p. I.) Ms. Macias's motion was denied for failure to file an affidavit. Id. at p. 3. Based on a later 
motion with an accompanying affidavit, the district court determined that Ms. Macias was indigent 
and granted her Motion to Proceed In Fmwa Pauperis and waived filing fees. (R., Vol. I, pp. 1, 8-
10.) Eventually, the district court dismissed the action without prejudice under LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) for 
failure to serve the complaint within six months. (R. Vol. I, p. 31.) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1 
Ms. Macias contends that she did not serve the complaint because she relied on the wording 
of Idaho Code § 31-3220 and the May 20, 20 IO Order Granting Motion to Proceed In Forma 
Pauperis. (Appellant's Briet: p. 7. See also R., Vol. l, p. 9.) Both state that "officers of the court'' 
shall issue and serve all process. Id. Ms. Macias further contends that this reliance satisfies the good 
cause requirement of Rule 4(a)(2). 1 It is based on this good cause argument that Ms. Macias seeks 
a reversal of the Order of Dismissal. 
B. Course of Proceedin~s. 
Club generally agrees with Ms. Macias's Course of Proceedings but would insert the 
following entries in the date-appropriate place: 
• On December 14, 2009 Ms. Macias filed a Motion and Affidavit for Permission to 
Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees. 
• On May 12, 2011 the Supreme Court entered an order 6rranting Ms. Macias an 
extension for filing her Appetlant's Brief to June 30, 20 l l. 
• On June 30, 2011 Appellant's Brief was due. No brief was filed. 
• On July 5, 2011 Appellant filed her brief. 
• On July 6, 2011 Appellant's Brief was returned for failure to comply with the 
appellate rules and the Supreme Court ordered a corrected brief to be ft led by July 
18, 2011. 
1This good cause argument was never presented to the district court and has been raised for 
the first time on appeal. 
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• On July 18, 2011 Ms. Macias's corrected brief was due. No corrected brief was filed. 
• On August I 0, 2011 Appellant's brief was again due pursuant to the July 27, 2011 
Order Re: Appellant's Brief. ~o brief was filed. 
• On September 2,2011 Appellant's brief was due pursuant to the August 18, 2011 
Order Allowing Non-Conforming Brief within 14 days. No brief was filed. 
• On September 7, 2011 Appellant's Brief was filed. 
Club would also add the following to the end of Ms. Macias's Course of Proceedings: 
• On September 13, 2011 the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals on the briefs. 
• On September 19, 2011 Club filed a Notice of Appearance and Intent to File Brief. 
• On November 1, 2011 the Court of Appeals resumed briefing and required 
Respondent's Brief to be filed by November 28, 2011. 
Club would also make the following corrections to Ms. Macias's Course of Proceedings: 
• Ms. Macias's May 5, 2010 entry should be dated May::!, 2010. 
• Ms. Macias's June 26, 2011 entry indicating that she had "filed" her Notice of 
Appeal should read that her Notice of Appeal was "received" by the district court on 
January 26, 2011. (R., Vol. l, p. 2 and40.) It was not filed until February 24,201 l. 
Id. 
• fvfs. Macias's May 9, 2011 entry should be dated May 11,201 l. 
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C. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
~fs. Macias's daughter died on or about January 20, 2008.2 
On July 28, 2009 Ms. Macias made a motion to proceed in.fiJrma pauperis and attempted to 
file her complaint. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 1, 3-4 and Appellant's Brief, p. 4.) No complaint was filed on 
that date. In fact, in denying the motion for lack of a supporting affidavit, the district court 
specifically ordered "the Complaint is not deemed to be filed in this matter and shall not be filed 
until this Court approves the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis upon a proper affidavit being 
filed or by the payment of the filing fee required in this matter." (R., Vol. I, pp. 3-4.) 
On January 20, 20 IO the applicable two year statute of limitations (Idaho Code§ 5-219( 4)) 
expired on the wrongful death/survival causes of action. No complaint had been filed by this date. 
On December 15, 2010 a Complaint for wrongful death/survival action was filed and 
Summons issued. (R., Vol. I, p. I; pp 15-23.) 
On January 26, 2011 the clerk of the district court received Ms. Macias's Notice of Appeal. 
(R., Vol. I, pp. 2, 40.) No Notice of Appeal was tiled on that date. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 2, 40.) Pending 
before the district court at that time was a motion and affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis on 
appeal. (R., Vol. 1, p. I.) Because of the pending motion the Notice of Appeal was not filed until 
February 24, 2011 after the district court entered an order waiving appellate filing fees. (R., Vol. 1, 
p. 33.) 
2There are other indications that she died on January 9, 2008 or January 19, 2008 but since 
January 20, 2008 is the date most favorable to Ms. Macias it will be used in this Brief. 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Club feels the issues on appeal can be more clearly and completely stated as follows: 
A. Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider this appeal? 
B. Did Ms. Macias have good cause for not serving the complaint on Defendant within 
six months? 
C. Did the district court abuse its discretion in dismissing Ms. Macias's complaint based 
on a failure to serve the complaint within six months? 
D. Can the dismissal be afiirmed on other grounds? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Supreme Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Consider this Appeal. 
The Supreme Court has held that it does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal if the 
Notice of Appeal is untimely, the Notice of Appeal is premature or the Notice of Appeal is not from 
a final judgment. See Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588,226 
P.3d 350 (201 O); 1:11; Inc. v. Mori, 148 Idaho 825,230 P.3d 435(2010) and Spokane Structures, Inc. 
v. Equitable Investment, LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010). Ms. Macias's appeal may 
suffer from all three deficiencies and may deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
l. The Notice of Appeal was Untimely. 
An appeal from the district court may be made by physically filing a Notice of Appeal within 
42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the Clerk of the Court on any judgment or 
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"order" of the district court appealable as a matter of right in any civil action. I.A.R. 14(a). If the 
Notice of Appeal is not timely tiled the appeal must be dismissed with prejudice. TJT, 148 Idaho 
at 436, 230 P.3d at 826. 
The Notice of Appeal appeals from a Notice of Dismissal filed on December 9, 20 l 0. (R., 
Vol. 1, p. 34.) It is clear on its face that the Notice of Dismissal is not a final judgment from which 
an appeal can be taken. ( R., Vol. I, p. 13.) It is merely a notice that the matter will be dismissed 
without prejudice in 14 days if the Plaintiff does not provide good cause why service was not made 
within the six months time period. Id. Regardless, the Notice of Appeal is untimely as it relates to 
this document. Ms. Macias's Notice of Appeal was not physically filed as contemplated by I.A.R. 
l4(a) until February 24, 2011. (R., Vol. I, p. 2, 40.) This was more than 42 days after the Notice 
of Dismissal was filed and the Court is without jurisdiction to consider an appeal from that Notice 
of Dismissal -- both on a lack of timeliness and lack of a final judgment. 
There is, however, a later filed document from which Ms. Macias may have intended to 
appeal. This document is the district court's Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice filed on 
December 30, 2010. (R., Vol. 1, p. 31.) This is the document that dismisses the matter and states 
that it is a final judgment or order from which an appeal may be taken. 3 Id. Because this document 
is more favorable to Ms. Macias regarding the timeliness of her appeal, this Brief will assume, 
v,ithout waiver, that it is the document from which she appeals. 
'See discussion below about whether this "order" of dismissal without prejudice is an 
appeal able final judgment. 
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Even this later filed document, however, does not cure the untimeliness of Ms. Macias's 
appeal. This document was filed on December 30, 2010. Id. Her Notice of Appeal was not filed 
until February 24,201 I, more than 42 days after it was filed. (R., Vol. I, p. 1, 40.) Because LA.R. 
Rule 14 requires that the Notice of Appeal be physically filed with the district court clerk within 42 
days of the filing stamp of the document appealed from, this appeal is untimely. 
It should be noted that the Notice of Appeal was originally submitted by Ms. Macias and 
received by the district court on January 26, 2011. Id. Had the Notice of Appeal been physically 
filed on the date it was received, an appeal from the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice would 
have been timely.4 
The District Court Clerk was correct, however, in not "filing" the Notice on January 26, 
2011. On January 18, 2011, prior to the original receipt of the Notice of Appeal on January 26, 
2011, Ms. Macias filed a Motion and Affidavit to Proceed In Forma Pcwperis on Appeal. (R., Vol. 
1, p. I.) Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 0(a)(6) states that all filing fees prescribed by Appendix "A" 
to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure must be paid before the filing of a pleading or motion listed 
in the filing fee schedule. LR.C.P. 1 0(a)( 6). Listed in the filing fee schedule, Appendix ·'A", are 
civil appeals ($60.00). See Idaho Code, Idaho Court Rules, Vol. l, p. 736 (2011 ). 
1The Notice of Appeal in the Clerk's Record has two filing stamps. The first, and easiest to 
read, is dated January 26, 2011. (R., Vol. !, p. 34.) It is, however, crossed out. The second file 
stamp, albeit difficult to read, is dated February 24, 2011 and is not crossed out. Id. Te Registry of 
Action notes that the Notice of Appeal was not filed until February 24, 2011. 
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Pursuant to Rule 10( a)( 6 ), the district court clerk could not file the Notice of Appeal when 
first presented on January 26, 20 l l because there was no filing fee paid or a waiver of the filing fee. 
The Order granting the fee waiver was not entered until February 24, 2011, the same day the clerk 
of the court physically filed the Notice of Appeal. (R., Vol. I, p. I.) The Notice of Appeal was 
therefore filed on February 24, 2011 in compliance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Although researched, Club has been unable to identify any exceptions to or good cause 
reasons for a late filed Notice of Appeal. An analogous appellate rule to I.R.C.P ., Rule I 0(a)(b) 
does, however, allow a document to be "lodged" with the Clerk of the Supreme Court until such time 
as the request for waiver has been decided. I.A.R. Rule 23(d). If the Supreme Court grants the 
waiver of the appellate filing fee the Clerk of the Court is then ordered to file the Notice of Appeal 
as of the date and time it was initially lodged with the Supreme Court. Id. Club could not find any 
similar rule that would have allowed the district court clerk to lodge the Notice of Appeal and then 
file it as of that date once the fee waiver was granted. It seems unfair and not in the best interest of 
justice to allow a delay by the district court to cause the appeal to be untimely. Nevertheless, Club 
is unaware of any "fairness" or "best interest of justice" exceptions to the jurisdiction of this Court 
if the Notice of Appeal is not physically filed within 42 days of the order being appealed. Idaho 
Appellate Rule and its grant of appellate jurisdiction is, however, mandatory and an untimely appeal 
must be dismissed. State v. Tucker, I 03 Idaho 885, 655 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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2. The Order of Dismissal \Vithout Prejudice is in Substance, ir not Form, a Final 
Appealable Judement. 
The next issue, for appeal purposes, is whether the document appealed from is a final 
judgment. The decision whether the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice is appealable has a large 
impact on the timeliness of the appeal. If the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, despite its title, 
is deemed to be a final jud1,m1ent then the appeal is untimely as described above. If the Order of 
Dismissal Without Prejudice is deemed not to be a final jud1,m1ent then the appeal is simply 
premature. Al though a premature Notice of Appeal is also ineffective to vest jurisdiction on appeal, 
a premature appeal can be cured. Spokane Structures, 148 Idaho at 621, 226 P .3d at 1268. Idaho 
Appellate Rule I 7(e)(2) indicates that a premature filing of a Notice of Appeal can be cured by filing 
an appeal able final judgment or decree. The appeal must still be dismissed if this is not done during 
the pendency of the appeal. But Ms. Macias will have an opportunity to obtain a final judgment 
from the District Court and proceed with an appeal. This in large part may be decided by how much 
weight form will be given over substance. 
Recent court cases and changes to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure require a final 
judgment to be a separate document and state the relief to which a party is entitled, including 
dismissal with or without prejudice. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a). See also Spokane 
Structures. Inc. v. Equitable Investment. LLC. 148 Idaho 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010). A final. 
appeal able judgment is not to contain a recital of pleadings, the court's legal reasoning or findings 
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of fact or conclusions of law. I.R.C.P. 54(a). This rule also requires that the document be entitled 
"Judgment" or "Decree". Id. 
Here, the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice is a separate document and states the relief 
to which Club was entitled - dismissal without prejudice. (R., Vol. I, p. 31.) The document does 
not contain a recital of pleadings or the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact or conclusions of 
law. Id. The document, however, is not entitled either "Judgment" or ''Decree". Instead, it is 
entitled "Order" of Dismissal With out Prejudice. Other than its title, however, in all other respects 
the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice meets the newly amended rules regarding final judgments. 
The precursor cases which led to the change in the rules regarding appealable finalj udgments 
have variously stated that an instrument is appealable based on its content and substance and not by 
its title. Spokane Structures, 148 Idaho at 620,226 P.3d at 1267; Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-
Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588, 591, 226 P.3d 530, 533 (20 I 0) ("It does not matter whether the 
order is entitled judgment, order, or decree."). In fact, the Supreme Court found a document entitled 
Order Granting Summary Judgment met the necessary elements to be considered a final judgment 
for purposes of appeal. Goodman Oil, 148 [daho at 590, 226 P .3d at 532. The rules in effect at the 
time of Spokane Structures and Goodman Oil, however, included "order" in those rules listing 
''judgments" and "decrees". The newly amended rules have specifically dropped the reference to 
'·order" and limited judgments to documents entitled ·'judgment" or '·decree".' 
'It should also be noted that on its face, the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice states that 
"[t]his is a final judgment or order from which an appeal may be taken within forty-two (42) days." 
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r f the order appealed from is deemed a final appealable judgment, the appeal must be 
dismissed with prejudice. If not, the appeal should be dismissed as premature unless cured. 
B. The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Lawsuit Pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2). 
If the appeal is not dismissed as untimely or premature, the district court erroneously 
dismissed the survival action/wrongful death lawsuit for failure to serve the complaint within six 
months of filing pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2).6 Rule 4(a)(2) requires service of the summons and 
complaint upon a defendant within six months atler filing of the complaint and if the serving party 
fails to do so must show good cause for that failure or the matter will be dismissed without prejudice. 
I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). Ms. Macias did not violate this rule and even had she failed to timely serve, she 
had good cause for any such failure. 
l. There Was No Six Month Period Following the Filing of Any Complaint Within 
Which Ms. Macias Failed to Complete Service. 
It appears that the district court ( and perhaps even Ms. Macias) was operating under the belief 
that a complaint was filed on July 28, 2009. This is an incorrect understanding. On July 28, 2009, 
Ms. Macias filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis or, in the Alternative Motion for 
Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees. (R., Vol. 1, p. L) It appears that on this 
same date Ms. Macias submitted a complaint. (See R., Vol. I. p. 3.) However, the Motion to 
Proceed In Forma Pauperis was denied because it did not have the affidavit required by Idaho Code 
(R., Vol. I, p. 31.) 
''Ul ti matd y, as discussed in detail below, the matter was proper I y dismissed forother reasons. 
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§ 31-3220. Id. In that denial the district court ruled that because there was no affidavit and the 
motion was denied without prejudice "the Complaint is not deemed to be filed in this matter and 
shall not be filed until this Court approves the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis upon a proper 
affidavit being filed or by the payment of the filing fee required in this matter." Id. at pp. 3-4. 
Later, however, the district court, in its Memorandum Re: Dismissal of Case Without 
Prejudice, stated that "Macias filed her initial complaint on July 28, 2009." (R., Vol. I, p. 27.) The 
matter was ultimately dismissed in part based on the district court's calculation of the time that had 
elapsed since she had "filed" her complaint on July 28, 2009. Id. ("It has been approximately 519 
days ( one year, five months, one day) since the complaint was filed in this matter and approximately 
223 days (seven months, nine days) since the Court issued its Order of Retention.") There was no 
complaint filed on July 28, 2009. 
Approximately five months later, and after her first Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 
was denied, Ms. Macias filed a new motion along with a proper supporting atlidavit for permission 
to proceed on partial payment of court fees. (R., Vol. I, p. l.) Instead of ruling on that pending 
motion, and still opt.1ating on the misunderstanding that a complaint was filed on July 28, 2009, the 
district court issued a Notice of Proposed Dismissal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(2) indicating that the case 
will be dismisst..'<.i given the absence of proof of service of summons and complaint upon the 
defendant within six months atler filing the complaint. (R .. Vol. L p. 6.) This Notice \Vas dated 
April 28, 20 l O and gave Ms. yfacias until May 12, 2010 to show good cause and propose a plan of 
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action justifying retention of the case by the court. Id. The obvious problem with this Notice is that 
no complaint had yet been filed and therefore no six month period had begun.7 
Within 14 days Ms. Macias filed a Motion to Reopen and/or Motion for Relief from a 
Judgment or Order. (R., Vol. 1, p. l.) The motion is not part of the record and it is not known the 
basis of that motion but the district court entered an order granting Ms. Macias's Motion to Proceed 
In Forma Pauperis on May 20, 20 l 0.8 Despite the granting of this motion no complaint was filed.9 
On December 9, 20 l O the district court issued another Notice of Dismissal indicating that 
"[t]his matter having been commenced by the of a filing Complaint on July 28, 2009, and the 
plaintiff having failed to serve the summons and Complaint within ( 6) six months atler the filing of 
the Complaint as required by Rule 4(a)(2), I.R.C.P.", and ordering that the matter be dismissed 
without prejudice in 14 days if Ms. Macias does not provide good cause why such service is not 
made within the six months time period." (R., Vol. l, p. 13.) In response to this Notice of 
Dismissal, and for the first time, a complaint was filed on December 15, 2010. (R., Vol. l, p. 15.) 
7It also appears that the district court is combining the requirements of Rule 4( a)(2) and Rule 
40(c) for dismissal of inactive cases. 
~The court also issued an Order of Retention on that same date indicating that the Notice of 
Proposed Dismissal had been issued in error because the court had given her time to respond to its 
Order Denying l\fotion to Proceed In Forma Puuperis Without Prejudice. (R., Vol. l, p. 11.) 
9Again, Club has been unable to find any rule allowing the district court clerk to lodge the 
initial complaint or for the district court to order the complaint to be filed upon granting the \lotion 
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and ordering the complaint to have been filed on the date it was 
originally lodged. (See discussion re: I.A. R. 14 supra.) 
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After filing the complaint Ms. Macias then filed a motion and declaration in support of a 
Motion for Order of Process of Complaint and Summons Upon Defendant based on the May 20, 
2010 Order Granting Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (R., Vol. I, p. l.) The Motion and 
declaration were filed on December 22, 2010. 10 Nevertheless, the district court, on December 30, 
20 I 0, entered an Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice once again based on Rule 4(a)(2). 11 (R., Vol. 
I, p. 31.) In its memorandum the district court once again notes the filing of a civil complaint on 
July 28,2010. (R., Vol. I, pp. 24, 25.) He also recognizes, however, that Ms. Macias responded to 
the December 9, 20 IO Notice of Dismissal by filing a "Civil Complaint" and a Motion and Order 
for Process of Service of that complaint. (R., Vol. I, p. 24.) The district court later refers to the 
December 15, 20 IO document as a "New Civil Complaint and a Summons". Id. at p. 26. Nowhere, 
however, does the court reconcile this "New Civil Complaint" with the district court's understanding 
that an initial complaint was filed on July 28, 2009. Instead, the district court orders the dismissal 
of the action based on a calculation of time that began on July 28, 2009 with the filing of the "ghost" 
complaint. Id. at p. 27. When the Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice was filed, the only actual 
filed complaint had been extant for a mere 15 days. 
No complaint was filed on July 28, 2009. At no time did the Rule 4(a)(2) six month period 
begin to run until December 15, 20 IO when a complaint was finally filed. The six month period had 
i
0Neither the declaration or motion was made part of the Appellate Record. 
11 This is the Order from which it is presumed the appeal has been taken. 
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in no manner expired as to this complaint before the district court dismissed the matter pursuant to 
Rule 4( a)(2) for failing to serve the complaint within six months of its filing. The district court erred 
in dismissing the matter based on this rule. 
2. There Was Good Cause Why There Has Been No Service of the Complaint or 
Summons. 
The issue of good cause is moot if the district court erred as analyzed above. Nevertheless, 
aside from the fact that the six month period had not expired, Ms. Macias had good cause for failing 
to serve a complaint and summons. 
Idaho Code§ 31-3220 sets forth the process for service by a person deemed indigent. Idaho 
Code § 31-3220(2-4). 
The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform 
all duties in cases in which the person is found by the court to be 
indigent. ... 
Idaho Code § 31-3220( 6). Ms. Macias was deemed indigent. Within days of filing her complaint 
she filed a motion and affidavit pursuant to Idaho Code§ 31-3220(6) stating that Idaho Code§ 31-
3220(6) is "silent as to whether the Supreme Court or Plaintiff need initiate the process or order to 
have the sheriff effectuate [sic] service .... " (R., Vol. I, pp. 27-28.) Although the district court 
recognized that this provision requires court officials to serve the summons and complaint in cases 
where a person is indigent. he found that "it is incumbent upon the indigent person, in this case 
Macias, to provii.ie the court officials with the summons. complaint and the necessary information 
(i.e., names of persons or entities to be served with associated addresses, etc.) so that such documents 
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can be served. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the indigent person to timely follow up with such 
oflicers to ensure that service has been completed or to take such other actions, in a timely fashion, 
that that person feels is appropriate (such as the filing of Macias· s 12/22/ IO motions)." (Id. at p. 28.) 
Despite recognizing the plain wording of Idaho Code § 31-3220( 6) and acknowledging that Ms. 
Macias followed up to ensure that service had been completed by filing her 12/22/ IO motions, the 
court found that Macias had not provided any facts which would justify good cause for the delay in 
serving the complaint and summons in this matter. (R., Vol. 1, p. 28.) "Indigence does not excuse 
inattentiveness. Furthermore, Idaho Code § 31-3220( 6) does not provide that court officials will 
prosecute or defend an indigence case." Id. 
First, as discussed above, this holding is based on the erroneous understanding that a 
complaint had been ti led on July 28, 2009 rather than 15 days before the court ruled as quoted above. 
Second, the district court appears to engraft upon Idaho Code§ 31-3220( 6) an unspoken requirement 
that the indigent must provide the "court officials" with the summons, complaint, and other 
information such as names and addresses so that the summons and complaint can be served. The 
district court further engrafts a requirement of the indigent to monitor these court officials to make 
sure they are doing their jobs. Nowhere in the wording of the statute, or in any other place, do these 
requirements exist. The plain wording of Idaho Code§ 31-3220(6} requires the officers of the court 
to issue and serve all process and perform all duties in cases involving indigent persons. 
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Research has not uncovered any Idaho cases interpreting this provision of Idaho Code§ 3 I-
3220. However, there is a federal statute identical in its wording. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 states that "[t]he 
officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases .... " 28 
U.S.C. § I 9l5(d). Federal case law appears to break into two camps. Some federal courts suggest 
that a pro se plaintiff must request service by the court to be entitled to such service. These 
decisions, however, appear to be based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c) which states that 
service maybe completed by a marshal or someone specifically appointed "at the plaintiffs request". 
F.R.C.P. 4(c)(3). However, the service provision relating specifically to indigent plaintiffs does not 
have the "at the request of plaintiffs" language. See 28 U.S.C. § l9l5(d). 
The other camp, usually interpreting28 U.S.C. § l9l5(d) have found that when a plaintiff 
is granted informa pauperis status the district court is required to serve process for the plaintiff. See 
Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.2d l l 99 ( 10th Cir. 2003) (case cited by Ms. Macias in her Appellant's Brief). 
Numerous Circuits have held that good cause exists to excuse a plaintiffs failure to serve where the 
plaintiff is proceeding informa pauperis and is therefore entitled to rely on service by the U.S. 
Marshal. See e.g., Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir. l 997) (case cited by Ms. 
Macias in her Appellant's Brief); Puett v. Bland/iJrd, l 92 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir. 1990); Byrd v. 
Stone, 94 F.3d 217, 219-20 (6th Cir. 1996); Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 
1990); Romandette v. Weetahix Co., 807 F.2d 309, 31 l (2nd Cir. l 986). The Ninth Circuit has held 
that a party proceeding in.fiJrma pauperis is entitled to have the summons and complaint served by 
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the U.S. Marshal (pursuant to Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4{c){2)(B)(i)). Puett, 912 
F.2d at 273. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has held that the district court's dismissal of an action 
brought by a plaintiff proceeding in Jonna pauperis for failure to effect service was erroneous 
because under 28 U.S.C. § l 9 l 5(c) the officers of the court should have effected services. Davis v. 
Dept. of Corrections, 446 F .2d 644 ( 9th Cir. 1971 ). None of these cases discuss any duties by the 
indigent person to start the process or monitor it. [tis up to the officers of the court to do that which 
they have been statutorily required to do. 
Any failure to serve, whether it be a phantom or actual complaint, should have been excused 
for good cause. It was incumbent on the District Court, as an officer of the court, to see that service 
was completed for Ms. Macias. The district court's failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. 
C. The Dismissal of the Matter Can Be Affirmed on Another Ground; the Complaint is 
Time Barred. 
a: as it appears, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint, the dismissal can still 
be affirmed if dismissal was correct on other theories or grounds. See Ewing v. State c~f Idaho, Dept. 
of Transportation, 147 Idaho 305, 306, 208 P. 3d 287, 288 (2009). Here, the complaint filed on 
December 15, 2010 was time barred under the statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 5-219( 4 ). 
The complaint filed in this action alleges two causes ofaction, both of which arise out of the 
death of Ms. Macias's daughter. ( R., Vol. I, pp. 15-23 ) The complaint's first cause of action is 
based on a survival action and the second cause of action is for wrongful death. Id. Ms. Macias's 
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<laughter died on or about January 20, 2008. The complaint was not filed until December 15, 20 I 0, 
nearly three years after the accident. 
The pertinent provisions of [daho Code § 5-219 state as follows: 
Within two (2) years: 
4. An action to recover damages ... for an injury to the person, or for 
the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another .. 
. the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time 
of the occurrence, act, or omission complained of. . .. 
Idaho Code § 5-219( 4 ). The "occurrence, act or omission" upon which a wrongful death or survival 
action accrues under Idaho Code § 5-219(4) is the date of death. See Chapman v. Cardiac 
Pacemaker's Inc., 105 Idaho 785,673 P.2d 385 (1983). Here, Ms. Macias's daughter died on or 
about January 20, 2008. The statute oflimitations ran on January 20,2010. The complaint was not 
filed until December 15, 20 I 0. The complaint is thereby time barred and should have been 
dismissed on that basis. 
Although the district court did not dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds, 
if there are no issues of material fact regarding when the cause of action accrued the question of 
accrual is a matter of law for the court. Nerco v. Knudsen, 140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d 894, 898 
( 1999). The dismissal can therefore be affirmed on this "other ground". 
The issue then becomes whether the statute of limitations is subject to tolling under the 
circumstances of this case. Research has not revealed any bar to the application of a statute of 
limitation based on a district court's role in helping to cause a complaint to be filed. The only non-
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statutory bar to a statute of limitations defense in Idaho is the doctrine of equitable estoppel. City 
ofJfcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 663, 201 P.3d 629, 636 (2009). The elements of equitable 
estoppel are as follows: ( l) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not 
discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it 
be relied upon; and ( 4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts 
were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to her prejudice. Id. 
Equitable estoppel does not eliminate, toll, or extend the statute of limitations. Id. It merely bars 
a party from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense for a reasonable time after the party 
asserting estoppel discovers or reasonably could have discovered the truth. Id. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not bar the application of the statute of limitations 
in this matter. First, Ms. Macias knew or could have discovered the truth regarding the fact that no 
complaint had been filed. In the Order Denying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Without 
Prejudice filed on September 8, 2009 the court specifically advised her that the motion was denied 
without prejudice and that "the Complaint is not deemed to be filed in this matter and shall not be 
filed until this Court approves the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis upon a proper affidavit 
being filed or by the payment of the filing fee required in this matter." ( R., Vol. 1, pp. 3-4.) As of 
September l 0, 2009 Ms. Macias knew that the complaint submitted to the district court on July 28, 
2009 had not been filed and would not be filed until she took farther action. At that time, she had 
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the option to submit the affidavit she failed to submit in the first place or pay the filing fee. She did 
neither prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on January 20, 2010. 
Ms. Macias did file a motion and affidavit on December 14, 2009 but apparently sought 
different relief - that is permission to proceed on partial payment of court fees. 12 The first effort 
made by Ms. Macias to provide the court with a proper Atlidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed 
In Forma Pauperis was filed on May 4, 20 I 0. This filing, however, occurred nearly four months 
after the statute of limitations had expired. 
Second, the first time that the district court erroneously indicated that a complaint had been 
filed on July 28, 2009 came in its Memorandum Re: Dismissal of Case Without Prejudice filed on 
December 30, 2010. (R., Vol. l, p. 24, 25.) This "false representation or concealment of a material 
fact" occurred after the statute of limitations had already expired. As a consequence, Ms. Macias 
could not have relied nor acted upon the representation or concealment to her prejudice. 
Ms. Macias could have discovered that her complained had not been filed on July 28, 2009, 
long before the statute of limitations expired and there was no period of time prior to that date that 
she was prevented from doing so or lulled into a false sense of security that it had in fact been filed 
on that date. The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not prevent the application of the statute of 
limitations in this matter. 
1='We do not know the sufficiency or insufficiency of this affidavit because it was not made 
part of the Appellate Record. However, the ROA report entitles what was provided as '·\,lotion and 
Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment of Court Fees (Prisoner)." (R., Vol. 1, p. I.) 
This is a different motion from a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 
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Nor is there a statutory bar to the application of the two year statute oflimitations to this case. 
Under Idaho Code § 5-219( 4) the only statutory bar is the ''discovery exception''. Idaho Code§ 5-
219(4). There is, however, no ''discovery" exception except for the leaving of foreign objects in a 
person's body. Cosgrove, ex rel. Wi11/ree v. Aferre/1 Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 117 Idaho 470, 788 
P.2d 1293 ( 1990). That exception does not apply to this matter. 
The complaint was first filed nearly one year after the two year statute of limitations had 
expired. Research has not revealed any applicable statutory or non-statutory bar to the application 
of the statute oflimitations. The complaint was time barred pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) and 
was therefore properly dismissed, albeit for other reasons other than that ruled on by the district 
court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The appeal should be deemed untimely and dismissed. If deemed timely the Order of 
Dismissal should be affirmed on other grounds, namely the complaint was time barred by the two 
year statute of limitations. 
DATED this Q.b day of November, 201 l. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the U day of November, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Debbie Macias /u.s. Mail 
P.O. Box 98 __ Hand Delivery 
Roberts, ID 83444 __ Federal Express 
Facsimile 
2-
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